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Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom
Dan Priel*
Abstract. Lon Fuller wrote extensively on freedom, but these writings are now largely unread. It is rare to find
them mentioned, rarer still to see any attempt to relate their ideas to Fuller’s writings on law and legal theory.
Perhaps reflecting the widely-accepted dichotomy between jurisprudence (conceptual) and political theory
(normative), these works are thought irrelevant to discussions on the nature of law. Fuller himself, however,
never accepted this dichotomy, so in this essay I try to offer an alternative reading of Fuller’s Morality of Law in
light of his writings on freedom. I argue that Fuller’s book should be understood as part of a broadly “republican”
view of freedom, which sees both law and freedom as the opposite of tyranny. I argue that there is considerable
textual support both in The Morality of Law and in his writings on freedom for a normative account of the
nature of law, one that does not exist peacefully alongside (let alone presuppose) a conceptual inquiry, but rather
challenges the possibility of value-neutral conceptual analysis of law.

I. Introduction
Some years ago Brian Leiter published an essay with the title “Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?”1
As one comes to expect from titles like this, he answered with an emphatic “No.” Jurisprudence is to
law, he suggested, as the philosophy of science is to science;2 and just as it makes no sense to talk about
American physics, one should not speak about American jurisprudence. Leiter is by no means alone; in
fact, this view seems to be the prevalent one among contemporary legal philosophers. In the words of
Joseph Raz, the mark of legal philosophy is that it is concerned with “the necessary and the universal”3
about law. What distinguishes legal philosophers from others writing on law, and what gives their
abstract and seemingly pointless debates their raison d’être, is that they concerned to identify what law
is, wherever and whenever it exists.

*
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. An earlier version of this essay was presented in a
symposium entitled “The Morality of Law at 50” at the University of Oxford. I thank Denis Galligan and the audience for
their comments and questions. I also thank Chris Boom, Eric Claeys, and Amir Paz-Fuchs, for very helpful written comments
and suggestions.
1
The essay is now reprinted in BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 81–102 (2007).
2
See id. at 84; but cf. Dan Priel, The Scientific Model of Jurisprudence, in NEUTRALITY AND THEORY OF LAW 239 (Jordi
Ferrer Beltrán et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter NEUTRALITY].
3
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 104 (2d ed. 2009); see also id. at 44; cf.
ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 136–37 (2007) (distinguishing philosophers’ interest “in truth” with
intellectual historians interest in philosophers’ “motivation” for their claims); H.L.A. Hart, Introduction to JOHN AUSTIN,
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at vii, xv (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (“Analytical and historical inquiries
provide answers to different questions not different answers to the same questions”).

This approach really came to dominate English-language jurisprudence in two famous works by
H.L.A. Hart, both published a little over fifty years ago.4 In these works Hart redefined the domain of
jurisprudence and established it, in line with prevalent philosophical ideas in the English-speaking
world at the time (especially at Oxford), as a philosophical inquiry of the “nature” or “concept” of law.5
These works also happened to be part of the decade-long exchange between Hart and Lon Fuller that is
now known as the “Hart–Fuller debate.”
It is fair to say that among legal philosophers most now believe that, not to put a fine point on it,
Hart wiped the floor with Fuller. In part, this is because Hart wrote in a style philosophers find more
congenial. In part, I think, the reason is that The Morality of Law has been misunderstood. Due to the
extraordinary influence the Hartian conceptual approach has had on English-language jurisprudence
in the last fifty years, his approach has become dominant, so dominant in fact that many have come to
think of it as the only way to approach the subject. As a result, Fuller’s own work has usually been
interpreted as an internal, conceptual, challenge to Hart’s account of the nature of law, one that
implicitly accepts the analogy between the philosophy of law and the philosophy of science.
I believe Fuller’s work makes more sense understood not as a half-hearted attempt at conceptual
jurisprudence, but as a committed effort at political jurisprudence, roughly, as an attempt to provide an
account of the role of law in a political community given certain political commitments. In this essay I
will try to show that by drawing on Fuller’s largely forgotten writings on freedom and connecting the
ideas found in them to his jurisprudential writings. After reconstructing Fuller’s argument I will argue
that his positions presuppose political ideas that have been prominent in American political history. In
this respect The Morality of Law, like much else that Fuller has written, is properly understood as
“American jurisprudence,” not because it was written by an American, but because it was written
against the background of the American political tradition.
Such a view is not immediately a challenge to conceptual jurisprudence. In fact, it would seem to
show that Fuller was interested in very different questions from the ones Hart and other legal
philosophers have been concerned with. It becomes a challenge to the very idea of conceptual
jurisprudence if it is possible to show that it makes no sense to talk about the nature of law outside any
such political foundations. That is how I will then argue one should read The Morality of Law. This
may not immediately seem the most natural reading of the book, because much of what Fuller says
looks as though he is trying to meet Hart on his own conceptual terms. There are, however, good
reasons to think this is not how Fuller wanted to be understood. Though I will address the matter in

4

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012) (1961) [hereinafter HART, CONCEPT]; H.L.A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].
5
See Dan Priel, H.L.A. Hart and the Invention of Legal Philosophy, 5 PROBLEMA 301 (2011). The idea of general or
universal jurisprudence predated Hart, of course, but it usually had meant something quite different. See id. at 306; Dan Priel,
Two Models of General Jurisprudence, 4 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295236.
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more detail later, here is one: Chapter 3 is entitled “The Concept of Law,” thus seemingly participating
in the same conceptual inquiry that dominated Hart’s book bearing that title. But the chapter opens
with an epigraph from Roscoe Pound that gives us a hint on what Fuller thought was the proper way
of answering the question “what is law?”: “ideas of what law is for are so largely implicit in ideas of
what law is, a brief survey of ideas of the nature of law from this standpoint will be useful.”6 As we shall
see, Fuller’s answer to the question “what law is for?” is thoroughly normative, which implies that he
thought that the answer to the “conceptual” question “what is law?” was itself the conclusion of a
normative, political, argument.7 That is the conclusion I ultimately hope to establish. To get to there,
however, I will have to start by examining Fuller’s views on freedom.

II. Freedom through Constraint
Freedom was a topic that occupied Fuller’s thought for many years. He has written several essays
specifically on it,8 and he has made many additional remarks on the topic that are scattered throughout
his other writings. Despite the significance Fuller obviously attached to the topic, these essays are now
forgotten even by those sympathetic to his ideas, and their relationship to his jurisprudential ideas
rarely explored.9 Fuller’s starting point in thinking about freedom is that no meaningful action is
6

See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 95 (rev. ed. 1969) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 25–26 (1922)). Interestingly, Fuller omits the words “from this standpoint” from his quote, suggesting
perhaps that he thought that this was the only standpoint for thinking about this question.
7
Fuller’s other epigraph on the same page is similarly revealing: “Forgetting our objectives is the most frequent of all acts
of stupidity.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS § 2.2.206 at 360 (R.J.
Hollingdale trans., 1986) (1879–80). (Fuller quotes it in the original German.) Fuller had used these words, to similar effect,
already in L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936).
8
See Lon L. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1955) [hereinafter Fuller, Suggested
Analysis]; Lon L. Fuller, Freedom as a Problem of Allocating Choice, 112 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 101 (1968) [hereinafter
Fuller, Allocating Choice]; Lon L. Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms—A Review of Robert L. Hale’s
“Freedom Through Law”, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (1954) (book review) [hereinafter Fuller, Reflections]; cf. Lon L. Fuller,
Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021 (1965) [hereinafter Fuller, Tyranny]. In addition, in 1958 Fuller delivered a
series of three lectures at Louisiana State University with the title “Freedom and the Nature of Man.” Of those, the only
remaining text is of the first lecture. See Lon L. Fuller, The Case Against Freedom, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 315 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001) [hereinafter Fuller, Case Against Freedom].
9
The neglect of Fuller’s work on freedom is most notable in ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984). This book
seeks to provide a critical survey and general assessment of the entirety of Fuller’s thought, yet it has barely a paragraph on his
writings on freedom and it never ties them to his legal theory. I know of only three articles that contain any extended
discussion of Fuller’s views on freedom. See Kenneth I. Winston, Legislators and Liberty, 13 LAW & PHIL. 389 (1994); Jeremy
Waldron, Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW & PHIL. 259 (1994); Jamie Cassels, Lon Fuller: Liberalism and
the Limits of Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 318 (1986) (reviewing SUMMERS, supra). Winston keeps Fuller’s discussion of
freedom separate from Fuller’s theory of law (so much so that he does not mention The Morality of Law in his essay).
Waldron explores some possible links between Fuller’s views on law and on freedom, but his conclusion on such links is
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possible without constraints. He makes this point many times and he takes it to be of general
applicability. It is only the constraints of language, for example, that turn the noises we emit into
meaningful expressions, thereby giving us the enormous freedom that comes with communication.
Less dramatically, it is only the constraints imposed by the rules of football that turn otherwise aimless
movements into a meaningful activity, thereby making the discussion and execution of various
strategies, formation and so on, possible.10
These constraints, said Fuller, create the social environment that makes interaction possible:
To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will
fall generally within some predictable pattern. To engage in effective social behavior men need the support
of intermeshing anticipations that will let them know what their opposite numbers will do, or that will at
least enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory from which responses to their actions will be
drawn. We sometimes speak of customary law as offering an unwritten “code of conduct.” The word “code”
is appropriate here because what is involved is not simply a negation, a prohibition of certain disapproved
actions, but also the obverse side of this negation, the meaning it confers on foreseeable and approved actions,
which then furnish a point of orientation for ongoing interactive responses.11

It is these meaningful interactions that explain what is valuable about freedom. And it is this view that
explains why Fuller wrote in an unpublished typescript that “forms”—norms and practices within
whose constraints individuals act—“liberate.”12 For Fuller this point had enormous significance in
terms of its stakes: “if we are to live with our fellows, our actions…cannot be effective unless they take
place within some framework that brings them into meaningful relation with the actions of others.”13
It also had enormous significance in terms of its scope: It pertained to “rules, procedures, and
institutions,” it relied on insights from different disciplines “cut[ting] across law, politics, economics,
sociology, and ethics, and even includ[ing] systems of play.”14 It was relevant to understanding “all

largely negative. See Waldron, supra, at 267–68, 272. Only Cassels draws some links between Fuller’s ideas on freedom and
his legal theory. See Cassels, supra, at 330–40. His discussion, however, is quite different from my own.
10
Years later, essentially the same idea, using similar terminology to Fuller’s, was found in STANLEY FISH, THERE IS NO
SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 108 (1994) (“Rather than being a value that is threatened by
limitations and constraints, expression, in any form worth worrying about, is a product of limitations and
constraints….Indeed, the very act of thinking of something to say…is already constrained…by the background context within
which the thought takes its shape.”). Fish’s dramatic claim in the title of his book turns out to be the much more modest (and
as shown here, familiar) idea that some constraints are necessary for freedom.
11
Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2–3 (1969) (emphasis added).
12
A photo of that typescript is reproduced in KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE
LON L FULLER, at ii (2012). Rundle is obviously aware of the significance of these words to Fuller—after all, they make up the
title of her book. But while she pays attention to the significance Fuller attached to “forms,” she attaches much less
significance to the second word. Like most commentary on Fuller, she does not consider Fuller’s writings on freedom and
their possible connection with his legal theory.
13
Fuller, Case against Freedom, supra note 8, at 320–21.
14
Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PHIL. 697, 704 (1956).

4

forms of social order,” including “contract, adjudication, the majority principle, and the three-strike,
four-ball rule.”15
Fuller drew important normative conclusions from this idea. It provided for him a justification for
the welfare state and for rejecting libertarian views on the appropriate limits on government.16 The idea
of the liberating force of forms also recurred in his writings on a diverse range of areas in law. He relied
on it to explain law in general (and in contradistinction from other forms of social order like contract,
adjudication, and so on),17 as well as particular aspects within law. Fuller wrote at length about the
“forms” of adjudication and compared and contrasted them with the “form” of mediation.18 More
narrowly, he famously used this idea of form to explain the role of consideration in contract
formation.19
How does all this relate to other perspectives on freedom? A hint appears in a brief handwritten
comment that accompanies the words “forms liberate” on his unpublished typescript. The words read:
“Cf negative concept of freedom.”20 Fuller associated the negative concept of freedom with Mill’s On
Liberty and he defined it as “leaving a man alone,…not imposing restraints on him.”21 Fuller considered
15
16

Id.
See Fuller, Reflections, supra note 8, at 77–78. Fuller writes there:
It is a great mistake…to equate the forces of the market with natural forces. In fact the economic market is an
artificial acquisition that it has taken mankind centuries to achieve. The most perfect markets are not those that arise
spontaneously, but those that are the result of deliberate organization and planning. To make such a market
function effectively, it may be necessary to impose restraints on economic freedom, as by restricting certain kinds of
dealings when the market is closed. It may also be essential to establish a governmental surveillance of the market (by
the SEC, for example) to prevent the exploitation of advantages by "insiders" and to insure that it will function as a
market is supposed to function.

Id. (footnote omitted). See also id. at 71 (endorsing “steeply graduated income tax”). Fuller also favored centrally organized
medical care over the one “thought of, and in part organized, after the market pattern.” Fuller, Suggested Analysis, supra note
8, at 1321. I therefore disagree with claims that Fuller had libertarian “attitudes” or “inclinations.” See Nicola Lacey, Out of
the ‘Witches’ Cauldron’?, in THE HART–FULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 26 (Peter Cane ed., 2010)
[hereinafter HART–FULLER DEBATE]; Cassels, supra note 9, at 339–40. Though Fuller admitted to being heavily influenced
by the ideas of Michael Polanyi, he departed from them in important respects. See Fuller, Suggested Analysis, supra note 8, at
1320 n.7; see also LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 700 (temporary ed. 1949) (distancing himself from
“individualism”), and the text accompanying notes 25–26, infra.
17
See Lon L. Fuller, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society Generally, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER, supra note 8, at 187, 188–90.
18
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its
Forms and Function, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation].
19
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
20
See RUNDLE, supra note 12, at ii. Rundle reports the page comes from Fuller’s notes to his “Reply to Critics.” See id. at
1. This suggests that at some point Fuller did think of drawing an explicitly link between his views on freedom and his ideas in
The Morality of Law, but his thoughts on this matter did not make it to the published version of his Reply.
21
Fuller, Allocating Choice, supra note 8, at 103.
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Mill’s conception of freedom highly problematic for several reasons. Mill emphasized the idea of
individual autonomy, but Fuller saw this “ideal of freedom” as the aspiration for “li[f]e as a hermit.”
He challenged it by saying that “[f]or most of us the life of freedom must be as members of society.”22
For related reasons, and in sharp contrast with Hart, Fuller also rejected the idea that survival was the
most fundamental desire shared by all humans; the true basic desire, he thought, was “maintaining
communication with our fellows,”23 not just as “a means of staying alive,” but also as “a way of being
alive,” at least in the only kind of life Fuller thought was worth living: “I doubt if most of us would
regard as desirable survival into a kind of vegetable existence in which we could make no meaningful
contact with other human beings.”24 Freedom was therefore valuable only to extent that it allowed and
promoted these ends.
This may strike some readers as an unfair characterization of negative freedom. Such writings often
tie freedom with the ability to choose and so associate greater freedom with a larger number of
available options. But Fuller had little sympathy for this idea as well. Fuller found Mill’s individualistic
conception of freedom “strangely blind to the fact that…[t]he choices a man can make without
requiring collaborative social effort for their realization are trivial.”25 Fuller went further: even if it
were possible, he thought this world of “unlimited choice,” for reasons now supported by empirical
evidence, utterly undesirable.26
Thus, one of the striking features of Fuller’s conception of freedom is that it is thoroughly social,
and there is little to nothing in it about individual autonomy.27 Consequently, it gives a central role to
institutions, including legal and political institutions, as means for creating the environment in which
freedom can flourish and be of value for human flourishing. When such institutions were in place
negative freedom was not irrelevant, but Fuller considered it of relatively marginal significance for the
law, because it dealt only with situations that did not involve the creation of any structuring restraints.
Fuller proposed the domain of sexual relations as one of the rare areas where there was no need “to
make arrangements for the sexual freedom of man; nature has seen to that.”28 Even here, notice, the

22

Fuller, Case Against Freedom, supra note 8, at 320.
FULLER, supra note 6, at 185.
24
Id. at 186. Hence Fuller’s conclusion: “can we derive from the morality of aspiration itself any proposition of law that
is substantive, rather than procedural, in quality?...I would find it in the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the
integrity of the channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire.” Id. at
184, 186.
25
Fuller, Suggested Analysis, supra note 8, at 1312.
26
Id. at 1311. The empirical data referred to in the text is summarized in BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
27
See Fuller, Case Against Freedom, supra note 8, at 321–22 (distinguishing freedom in his sense from the sense of
“freedom as self-liberation,” “in which a man can achieve freedom by his own efforts”).
28
Fuller, Suggested Analysis, supra note 8, at 1311. Michel Foucault would probably have said that Fuller was too hasty in
this conclusion.
23

6

domain was not devoid of restraints, rather they were provided by nature. In any event, outside of such
unusual cases, the real normative problem with freedom was different:
When we discuss freedom as a problem of law, or politics, or economics, or ethics, we are really addressing
ourselves to the question: How can the freedom of human beings be affected or advanced by social
arrangements, that is, by laws, customs institutions, or other forms of social order that can be changed or
preserved by purposive human actions?29

Fuller’s answer to this question is the key to understanding the way he connected his ideas on freedom
to his views on law.

III. Reinterpreting The Morality of Law
At its most general, my claim in this essay is that the ideas in The Morality of Law make more sense if
read together with these political ideas. If I am right, one reason why this book has often been treated
so harshly has to do with the fact that Fuller did not do enough to highlight these links. It may be
(although this is mere speculation) that Fuller believed he could beat the conceptual positivist at his
own game, that he could show that even on narrow conceptual grounds legal positivism fails. And he
may have chosen this narrower line of attack since he did not want to be seen as engaging in a question
that some might argue could peacefully co-exist alongside the conceptual inquiry. I will not address
here the question whether conceptual jurisprudence can be challenged even on its own, or whether one
can find in The Morality of Law a challenge to legal positivism that does not depend on Fuller’s views
on freedom.30 In this section I try to spell out in more detail how what Fuller says in The Morality of
Law makes sense if its ties to Fuller’s political ideas on freedom are made explicit. In subsequent
sections I turn to the question whether this view can also be seen as a challenge to the possibility of
conceptual jurisprudence.

(a) The Structure of Fuller’s Argument
To see in what way my attempt to tie Fuller’s argument to his ideas on freedom is different from the
prevailing understanding of Fuller’s account, let me present what I take to be the general outline of the
accepted interpretation of Fuller’s challenge to legal positivism:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Law as a conceptual matter has a certain function (law is a functional kind).
Law’s function establishes its nature.
Law’s function also entails certain constraints on legality, the principles of legality.
The principles of legality are law’s “internal morality.”

29

Id. at 1309.
Elsewhere I have suggested that a Fuller-inspired argument can give us reasons to doubt Hart’s account even on its
own terms and without invoking Fuller’s ideas on freedom. See Dan Priel, Reconstructing Fuller’s Argument Against Legal
Positivism, 26 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399 (2013).
30
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(v) From (iv) it follows that there is a necessary connection between law and morality.
(vi) Legal positivism is the thesis that there is no necessary connection between law and morality.
(vii) From (v) and (vi) it follows that legal positivism is false.

Legal positivists have responded in different ways. Some have rejected (i), telling us that “[t]here is no
social function, nor any combination of social functions, that distinguishes law from any of its near
neighbours.”31 Some have attacked (ii) with the claim that “while no one would doubt the importance
of knowing why we should have law…this cannot be an argument for the thesis that the law is one way
or another.”32 Still others have rejected the idea that the principles of legality have anything to do with
morality,33 a view that amounts to a rejection of (iv). Finally, recently, many legal positivists have come
to think (vi) is false.34
There is much to say about each of these responses, but that is not the strategy I adopt here. Based
on Fuller’s work on freedom I will present a different, political, argument on his behalf. The argument
in outline looks like this:
(1) Freedom does not consist in being left alone or with the removal of constraints, but with the
creation of means that make purposive action possible.
(2) From (1): constraints are necessary for meaning and thereby for freedom.
(3) There are several forms of constraint (forms of social order). Law is one of them. Law is thus a
means for generating human freedom.
(4) Law typically creates constraints by way of general “rules” that (should) assist individuals in
regulating their relationship with each other.
(5) When someone is subject to a rule imposed by another she has a valid concern over its legitimacy,
over the right of the rule-maker to enforce it. (When it lacks such legitimacy in the context of a
state we typically call it a “tyranny.”)35
(6) Law is a particular kind of rule-governed practice: it is in the form of an ongoing activity or
enterprise grounded in the idea of reciprocity.
(7) (6) explains the way of addressing the problem raised in (5) with relation to law: law is also
legitimated in a unique way, not shared by other rule-giving practices.36 The unique legitimating
requirements of law (derived from the idea of reciprocity) are the eight principles of legality.
31

JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON LAW IN GENERAL 293 (2012); see also Leslie Green,
Introduction to HART, CONCEPT, supra note 4, at xxxv (ascribing this view to Hart).
32
JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 384
(2009); cf. HART, CONCEPT, supra note 4, at 248–49.
33
H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) (reviewing FULLER, supra note 6).
34
See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 31, at 254; RAZ, supra note 32, at 176–78. Other legal positivists rejecting (vi) are cited
in Priel, supra note 30, at 411 n.44.
35
Fuller himself uses the term “lawless violence” as a contrast to law. See FULLER, supra note 6, at 108. Fuller also
implicitly contrasts law here with mediation, which Fuller characterizes by “its capacity to reorient the parties toward each
other, not by imposing rules on them but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship.”
Fuller, Mediation, supra note 18, at 325. Because of its different form, the problem of legitimacy is solved differently in the
case of mediation. See id. at 314–15
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(8) It is because of (7) that adherence to the requirements of legality makes law possible: they are
law’s “natural law.” Without them the reciprocal nature of law (see (6)) becomes impossible.
(9) From (8) it follows that a putative legal system that fails to abide by these principles is not simply
a bad legal system, but in some sense no law at all.

It should be clear that whatever faults this argument may contain, it is immune to the
counterarguments presented to the conceptual argument attributed to Fuller. And I hope to show in
what follows, it is not a conceptual argument (or, if you wish, it establishes conceptual conclusions on
normative grounds, rather than the other way around). The rest of this section is dedicated to assessing
it in more detail in relation to some of Fuller’s famous ideas. I will try to show how and where they fit
within the argument just outlined. I hope to show that even if not ultimately convincing, these ideas
are not as odd as many of Fuller’s critics have found them.

(b) The Link with Freedom
Freedom figures twice in the argument I reconstructed on behalf of Fuller. It first appears there
directly in (1), as the starting point for the argument explicating the value of law, but in this respect,
law is no different from any other constraint. It is less obvious, but freedom plays a role in (7) as well.
Showing this is the main task of section IV below, but in general outline the idea is this: Law is one of
the institutions that provide the constraints that make freedom possible. One of the characteristic
features of law, unlike say, joint purposive activity done with a common end in mind, is that law (or at
least modern law) typically operates by subjecting humans to the governance of rules imposed by
others. As a result it is subject to concerns of legitimation of the rule-maker. We see these concerns in
the way we distinguish between brute demands backed by force and a legitimate, or at least potentially
legitimate, demand (where the judgment of legitimacy is made relatively independently of the content
of the demand). As we shall see, this is related to a fundamental distinction between law and tyranny.
According to Fuller to avoid tyranny the relationship between the rule-maker and rule-subject must be
grounded in some idea of reciprocity. The principles of legality serve a necessary role in creating such a
reciprocal relationship, such that when they are absent the result, even if it has the superficial
appearance of law, is tyranny.
The conclusion, whether warranted or not, is not a claim about prevailing linguistic usage, it is not
a claim about what people have in their head when they talk about law, it is not an irrefutable claim
about what “the concept of law” just is. It is the conclusion of a normative argument. It is also not
conceptual at further remove. It is not based on any alleged elucidation of the concept of freedom
means, but on what makes freedom a value worth pursuing.

36

See FULLER, supra note 6, at 210–11. See also the discussion in note 42 and section III.(d), infra.
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(c) Subjecting Human Conduct to the Governance of Rules
Fuller did not think that there was any particular purpose that law was concerned with: he repeatedly
says that law is indifferent between numerous different aims.37 He did believe, however, that law had
one general aim that he described, somewhat cryptically, as “subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules.”38 Though this expression sounds as though it is nothing but a long-winded way of
saying “rule following,”39 Fuller rejects the picture of law as primarily concerned with either guidance
of conduct (on part of the lawmakers) or rule-following (on part of the law-subjects). Mere rule
following, he says, is the mark of “managerial direction” between superiors and subordinates, which he
distinguishes from law. Unlike managerial disretion, which seeks to promote a particular aim set by the
manager, law’s function is not to tell people what to do or not to do but to create “an orderly
interaction among citizens and furnish dependable guideposts for self-directed action.”40
Corresponding to this substantive difference there is also a difference in the “internal morality” or
“natural law” of managerial discretion and law. He repeatedly refers to law as the subjection of humans
to the governance of rules, and is similarly restrictive in treating as the full set of the principles of
legality as unique to law. While five of the eight principles of legality are “quite at home in the
managerial context,” the other three are unique to law.41
Why is that? One aspect of the “subjecting humans to the governance of rules” that has not
received sufficient emphasis is that of “subjecting,” namely that of having the “governance of rules”
created and imposed by other than those who are subjected to them. The rules in question are often
imposed without consent. For these rules to have normative force—to be different from both mere
pronouncements that lack normative force (“all must pay twenty per cent of their salary to Dan Priel”)
and from edicts of the tyrant (the force of whose rules comes from threat)—they must be legitimate.
Legality thus does not, or not merely, require looking to the past of legal norms, to the see whether
they have been promulgated according to a particular “rule of change” in accordance with a “rule of
recognition”; it requires considering their present assessment beyond that goes beyond legal rules. That
present involves the maintenance of an ongoing existence of a kind of reciprocity between lawgiver and
37
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subject “that is part of the very idea of a functioning legal order.”42 This substantive idea finds its
counterpart in the three principles of legality that are unique to law, as their role is to guarantee “the
existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of expectation between lawgiver and subject is part of the
very idea of a functioning legal order.”43 It is because of this that Fuller says that his view “treats law as
an activity and regards a legal system as the product of a sustained purposive effort.”44 A legal order or a
legal system is not the sum total of rules, but (also, and distinctly) an ongoing social practice.
Correspondingly, living in a political community governed by law is a continuous, reciprocal enterprise.
It requires constant “work” to sustain it. It is this aspect of law missed by those theories that focus only
on the rule following aspect of “subjecting humans to the governance of rules.”

(d) The Internal Morality of Law
One of the best known (and contested) ideas in The Morality of Law is that law contains its own
internal (or inner) morality. To fully understand this term we must consider four questions: First, in
what sense are the principles of legality “internal” to law? Second, in what sense are they a “morality”?
Third, in what sense are they “of law,” or in other words, in what sense are they unique to law? And
fourth, what does it mean that a significant enough departure from the principles of legality results in
something that is “not simply bad law, but not law at all”?45 In this subsection I will answer the first
three questions; I will address the last one in subsequent sections.
The answer to the first question is fairly simple. The principles of legality are “internal” in that they
do not assess laws on their success in promoting whatever goal the law was designed to deal with (be it
the reduction of crime or pollution, the redistribution of wealth, the improvement of educational
standards, or any other such goal); rather they are internal in the sense that they are concerned with
the question of the pursuit of these goals through law, i.e. through the distinct means of “subjecting
humans to the governance of rules.”
Turning to the second question, a familiar criticism of this argument, one made more-or-less
similarly by Hart, Dworkin, and Raz, is that the principles of legality are a matter of efficiency, not
morality. Hart offered the example of the “internal morality of poisoning” as a reductio of the idea.46
We now have the tools to see why this argument misfires. It is worth noting first that all those who
thought they have shown how Fuller foolishly overlooked an obvious but devastating logical
42
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implication of his position have not noticed that Fuller has made the point himself, before them. In
The Morality of Law he talks of the “natural laws of carpentry, or at least those rules respected by a
carpenter who wants the house he builds to remain standing and serve the purpose of those who live in
it.”47 Almost a decade earlier Fuller has noted a possible objection to his view, that it “confuse[s] the
question of ultimate value with that of selecting the most effective means for realizing an immediate
purpose”. As he put it there, “[t]hat there are good and bad ways of opening clams leaves untouched
the question whether opening clams is itself an activity entitled to be called good.”48 In another article
from around that time he was clear about the wide scope of his idea: “any form of social order
contains…its own internal morality. Thus, we may judge football by an external standard and say,
‘Football is a good game,’ but we may also judge it by standards drawn from its internal requirements
and say ‘Football will become impossible if this sort of thing is allowed to go on.’”49 This, for Fuller, was
a thesis that “range[s] from the most trival [sic] to the most crucial that human beings can face.”50
Most strikingly, writing in 1949 Fuller saw no difficulty in talking even about the “natural laws of a
dictatorship.”51
By focusing only on one manifestation of it—the internal morality of law—we inevitably fail to
understand the full significance of the idea of internal morality. The example of football helps clarify
what Fuller meant by it. The “natural laws” of football are not the constitutive rules of the practice—
they are not, say, the rules that determine the size of a football pitch or the number of players per team.
If that had been Fuller’s meaning, his argument would have amount to the pointless attempt (and,
unless one is a Platonist about football, devoid of an answer) to identify the point at which changing
the rules of football results in something that is not football anymore. What Fuller meant by the
notion of internal morality is something else: here are certain precepts, typically only implicitly
acknowledged, that have to be maintained for an activity to have potential for succeeding in bringing
about the very goals set up for the activity by those engaged in it. When this is understood it no longer
seems so strange to talk even of the natural laws of a dictatorship. The example is also useful because it
highlights that it is wrong to think Fuller was engaged in the conceptual or classificatory exercise often
attributed to him.
All this highlights the tension within the term “internal morality.” Even if one accepts that all
practices have these kinds of “natural laws,” it might seem odd to call all of them a “morality.” Much of
the resistance to Fuller’s idea could have been avoided if this idea had been formulated slightly
47
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differently: all practices have their “natural laws” (which are not necessarily moral), but in the case of
law (and possibly other social practices) these natural laws are moral in nature.52 The reason why the
natural laws of law are moral in nature has to do with their specific content. More precisely, the natural
laws of law are moral because they play a role in legitimating the subjection of humans to the
governance of rules imposed by others without the rule-subjects’ consent. This is not a concern in the
case of a practice like football.
All this, together with what I have already said in the previous subsection also answers the third
question posed above, namely the sense in which the internal morality unique to law. To repeat briefly,
the full set of the eight principles of legality establish the kind of reciprocity between lawgiver and
subject “that is part of the very idea of a functioning legal order.”53 One point not mentioned before is
how this idea of reciprocity explains the centrality of governance of rules (rather than particular
orders) to Fuller’s account. Rules are essential for the creation of expectations, themselves important
for generating the reciprocity he took to be essential for law: “the citizen cannot orient his conduct by
law” when the orders “confront[] him merely with a series of sporadic and patternless exercises of state
power.”54 This again highlights the role of the principles of legality in establishing the reciprocity Fuller
thought was necessary for legitimacy. This is very different from the view that the principles of legality
are there only for the sake of efficient transmission of edicts to be followed.

IV. Freedom and The Morality of Law
In the course of The Morality of Law Fuller distinguishes between law and managerial direction,
between law and morality,55 between law and lawless violence,56 between the law of a generally just
regime and what may look like law but is what one finds in evil regimes,57 even between law and
contract.58 All this lends credence to the view that Fuller participated here in the kind of “conceptual”
or “classificatory” enterprise that has dominated analytic jurisprudence in the last fifty years. This, I
think, is quite clearly a mistake.
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Fuller does indeed distinguish between law and nonlaw, but his distinction is the conclusion of a
political argument that ties law with legitimacy, legitimacy with reciprocity, and reciprocity with
freedom. I have discussed the first two ties in the previous section. This section deals with the third.
Along the way I hope to show that Fuller develops here an idea with a long history in political thought,
and one that has had particular resonance in the history of American politics. In the next section I
consider the implications of this perspective to the methodology of general jurisprudence.

(a) Fuller’s Republicanism
One would be forgiven for thinking that every aspect of Fuller’s decade-long exchange with Hart has
already been comprehensively discussed. But let me add a chapter to that exchange, one that as far as I
know, has so far escaped attention. In one of Fuller’s essays on freedom, published in 1968 (i.e., a year
before the publication of the “Reply to Critics”), he wrote:
An English scholar, who spent a year in this country, on his return home gave a talk on one of BBC’s radio
programs attempting a kind of anthropological appraisal of the two cultures, the American and the
English. He reported that the two peoples hold two quite different views of the nature of freedom. To the
Englishman the primary meaning of freedom is to be left alone; the American—to quote our visitor’s
phrasing—conceives of freedom as “the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.”59

Though left unnamed, the English scholar in question is no other than H.L.A. Hart. The passage Fuller
quoted comes from a little-known, brief piece Hart published upon his return to Britain after his year
at Harvard. The relevant passage reads in full:
For us [the English], surely, liberty is this: that there is a circle round each man, inside which he can do as
he pleases, and it is no concern of others; this is the liberty the Englishman has inside his house and garden
and behind its hedges. I think that this as an ideal makes little appeal to an enormous number of
Americans; I believe you can find what the American means by liberty by looking at the Constitution of an
American State: In the State of Massachusetts the Constitution provides that any member of the public
may introduce a measure into the Legislature and argue for it before committees. And it seems to me that
this is what An American means by liberty; the right to take part in what he would call ‘the decision-making process’.60

The question to be answered about these two views is not which better captures the “correct” concept
of freedom, a debate that has no answer. The debate between these two views is which view (concept,
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conception, understanding, notion, idea) of freedom is more normatively attractive. In defense of the
“American” view Fuller wrote:
[I]f society seriously left a man alone, and thrust none of its facilities on him, he would starve to death. It
might also be observed that the original meaning of the words “liberty” and “freedom” was not absence of
constraint, but enfranchisement. To be free, to enjoy liberty, was—in the original significance of those
terms—to be admitted to effective participation in the affairs of the family, the tribe, or the nation. And
meaningful participation in affairs requires that one accept, and act through, the forms of procedure that
make possible a functioning whole.61

Leaving aside Fuller’s lexicographic claim, Fuller makes here two points that should by now be familiar.
The first is that being left alone cannot be a desirable normative goal, because its full realization would
not lead to a good life, but to death. The second point is that freedom is better understood as
participation, and participation can be meaningful only it is structured within certain “forms of
procedure.”
In many respects these ideas draw on a particular conception of freedom, one that in recent years
has regained prominence under the banner of “republican” or “neo-Roman” freedom.62 There are
several hints that this is the tradition Fuller is drawing on. At the most superficial level, there are the
sources Fuller relies on in his work. In The Morality of Law itself Fuller discusses some of the historical
origins of his ideas and he points to the works of English Leveller John Lilburne,63 and republican
American framers like Alexander Hamilton.64 His prime example comes from Edward Coke, whose
ideas have important affinities with republican notions of freedom, in particular the idea of freedom as
the product of law.65
There are more important similarities. As we have also seen Fuller’s conception of freedom is first
and foremost a political concept: Fuller does not talk of freedom in terms of personal autonomy, but as
61
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a value of significance for people within a political community. This perspective is also reflected in
contemporary republican work on freedom.66 It is also interesting that though Fuller rejected the
Millian “negative” conception of freedom in no uncertain terms, he did not align his view with any of
the ideas Isaiah Berlin identified as central to the “positive” conception of freedom.67 That too is in line
with the work of contemporary republicans who have talked of republican freedom as a third
“concept” of freedom.68 Fuller also rejected the quasi-quantitative approach to freedom, according to
which one can measure whether one person is freer than another by the number and intensity of
restraints imposed upon her. He stated that it was wrong to think that Americans are freer than
Soviets in that they have “more yards of freedom to their citizens than do totalitarian regimes,” i.e.
simply more options available to them. The real difference lies “in the procedures by which it is
determined how choice shall be allocated.”69 A “realistic analysis of economic freedom would concern
itself with determining how the citizen can effectively participate in the following vital decisions,” like
“[w]hat resources of society shall be drawn into production and how they be organized and allotted
among the various productive enterprises? Who shall work where and at what jobs?”70 Once again, this
is a view reflected in more recent republican writings on freedom.71
Some may challenge my association of Fuller with republican thinking by pointing out that he
does not talk of what is nowadays taken to be the sine qua non mark of republican freedom, the idea of
nondomination. There is no denying that Fuller does not talk of nondomination, but even here
matters are not clear-cut. First, even in historical republican writings (rather than their recent
philosophical reconstruction), nondomination is not always the central concept, at least not explicitly.
What one does find is an emphasis on the idea of self-government as a way for members of a polity to
be “in charge” (and thus free) and as a mechanism for decentralizing power and thus limiting the
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potential for its abuse.72 Fuller’s notion of reciprocity may be understood as an attempt to adapt the
notion of self-government to the conditions of the modern state.73 Second, I believe the contrast
between law and tyranny (that I discuss in more detail in the next subsection) is directly linked to the
idea of freedom as nondomination.

(b) Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence
Now that Fuller’s ideas on freedom are clearer, we can see how they complement his jurisprudence.
The central idea is that inherent in law are certain implicit restrictions on power such that “unlimited
power” is synonymous with “lawless power.”74 John Locke provides a crisp, forthright, articulation of
its central idea: “Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins.”75 Locke further stated that
in all states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty is, to
be free from restraint and violence from others which cannot be, where there is no law: But Freedom is
not, as we are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists: (For who could be free, when every other
Man’s Humour might domineer over him?) But a Liberty to dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person,
Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow his own.76

On this view law and freedom are both contrasted with tyranny in the sense that the elimination of
tyranny requires the creation of laws. As Locke has stressed “the end of Law is not to abolish or
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom.”77
These ideas played a significant role during the American revolution,78 and as the quote from Hart
above has shown they continued to have resonance in American life in the 1950s. Against this
background, the following words from Fuller’s first reply to Hart appear in a new light:
[T]here is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can
so far depart from the morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal
system. When a system calling itself law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges of the terms of the
laws they purport to enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even the grossest, by
retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the streets, which no one dares
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challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality—when all these
things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law.79

To illustrate this point consider one of Fuller’s less known fables, one that tells the story of the mirrorimage of Rex, the antihero of The Morality of Law. Rex was a good-intentioned malevolent ruler; the
protagonist of this story is the mean-intentioned benevolent ruler. As Fuller does not name him, I will
call him Anti-Rex. Though Anti-Rex is “bent entirely on serving his own interests,”80 he comes to
realize that for the sake of increasing his own self-interest, he should accord his subjects some
discretion. “Simply from the standpoint of engineering efficiency in achieving a goal, some discretion
and choice must…be accorded the human agent.”81 The self-interested ruler, then, realizes that to
promote his own interests he should make his subjects happy, as they are more likely to serve him in
such circumstances. For that end, the subject “must feel that he is serving not only the ends of another,
but his own as well.”82 In the last step, Anti-Rex realizes that he should allow people to improve and
develop themselves for his own sake.
If this sounds like an odd tyrant, it is because this was precisely Fuller’s point:
Our tyrant, you will observe, has found himself caught in a kind of progression. He started by seeking
engineering efficiency, he then moved at least some way toward doing what is essential for human
happiness, and he may end by fostering the conditions most conducive to human development. If he
traverses fully the three steps of this progression he will, of course, finish by ceasing to be a tyrant.83

There are certain ambiguities in the story: does Fuller mean that tyranny is irrational for the person
exclusively intent on the pursuit of his own interests? Or does he mean that the reflective tyrant will
come to see the wrongness of his ways? We can leave these questions unanswered, for a more pressing
question is, Is Anti-Rex’s move away from tyranny also inevitably a move into law? I have already
quoted Fuller’s claim that “[t]o embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a
responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.”84 He
added that the principles of legality lose their “reason for being” if humans are treated as incapable of
responding to reasons. In an important sense the steps taken by Anti-Rex reflect a similar transition.
Fuller describes the three steps in question as an affirmation of the idea that law “by its very nature [is]
a cooperative enterprise.”85
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More generally, Fuller grasped here the fact that the moral evaluation of law is not limited to what
it demands, but also to the manner in which it makes its demands.86 This is something that Fuller’s
critics who have contended that the principles of legality are merely a matter of efficiency completely
miss out. The principles of legality are part of the broader question of the legitimacy of the state, the
one specific to the question of lawmaking. And it is, one could possibly say, “internal” or “special” to
law, because it is moral evaluation that takes into account aspects unique to the law. “External”
morality is equally applicable to the evaluation of a friend’s advice as it is to evaluating the law; the
principles of legality (so Fuller argued) are not.

(c) Evil Regimes
I kept for last the discussion of “evil regimes,” because it builds on the argument developed in this
section. In its Fullerian guise the “evil regimes” argument asserts that a putative legal system that fails
to maintain the principles of legality results in something that is “not simply bad law, but not law at
all.”87 Like the entire “evil regime” debate, I believe this is a much less important than it is made to be.
Indeed, if understood as a purely conceptual question, it is nothing more than a verbal dispute.88 To
give it some sense, it needs to be understood as the conclusion of a political argument. To summarize
the point of the last section, if a legal governance is understood in opposition to tyranny, then the
principles of legality are to be understood as constraints on the arbitrary power that is the mark of
tyranny. It is in this way that Fuller’s claim that “the citizen cannot orient his conduct by law if what is
called law confronts him merely with a series of sporadic and patternless exercises of state power,”89 a
claim made as part of his attempt to explain why “‘public order’…which may serve to keep people off
the streets and in their homes”90 is not law. Framed in this way, the argument can only be understood
(and challenged) on the basis of its normative assumptions about freedom.
Fuller has supplemented this normative claim with an empirical one to the effect that a regime
that maintains the principles of legality is less likely to be substantively immoral. More precisely, the
empirical argument comes in two versions, weak and strong. The weak version can be presented as
follows:
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(a) Social practices have their own “natural laws” that make them possible.
(b) Law’s “natural laws” are the principles of legality, because these principles make subjecting
humans to the governance of rules (in the way explained above) possible.
(c) Adherence to the principles of legality in this way presupposes respect for human personhood.
(d) Respect for human personhood does not go along with support for some substantively
immoral laws.
(e) Therefore, a legal system that adheres to the principles of legality is less likely to be
substantively immoral, at least insofar as the immorality in question manifests itself in
disrespect for personhood.
I think this argument is sound, but it may not amount to much. It boils down to, roughly, “those who
respect personhood (in procedural contexts), are likely to respect personhood (in substantive
contexts).” So understood there is no causal connection between caring about the principles of legality
and substantive morality. Rather, the claim is that those who accept the reasons behind respecting the
principles of legality and act upon them are likely to see similar reasons to treat humans with respect in
the substantive laws they enact. Though this is a weak claim, it is still significant for blocking many of
the criticisms leveled at Fuller’s argument. It explains why those who accept the principles of legality
only if, and to the extent that, they help them advance other goals are not likely to care about
substantive morality. It thus serves to distinguish between two ways of being concerned with the
principles of legality and their practical implications.91
The strong version of Fuller’s argument is more interesting, but also much more difficult to accept
without supporting empirical evidence. It suggests some causal link between maintaining the
principles of legality and substantive morality. Some years before The Morality of Law Fuller wrote that
the “[p]ower [to make and enforce rules] is ineffective as a principle of social organization unless it is
legitimated, that is, unless it is accepted as right and proper by at least a substantial portion of those
subject to it.”92 The reason is that “[n]o social organization above the level of an alley gang was ever
organized about the capacity to inflict physical harm.…[N]o society has ever been organized through
descending echelons of physical fear.”93 Indeed, to the limited extent that sheer force exists, three
things obtain: based on sheer power it is parasitic on an organization not itself based on physical fear,
the efficiency of such organization is low, and over time “some obscure conception of fairness and right
dealing” tends to emerge.94
Fuller asserts here that beyond the most basic uses of force, power requires legitimation to
maintain itself, and that as a matter of fact it tends to generate processes that legitimate it. The
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principles of legality can thus be understood as the road to legitimation. Against this background, the
strong version of Fuller’s empirical argument is that a regime that starts with concern for the principles
of legality only out of self-interest (i.e., only to the extent that it serves its goals) may over time drift
towards respecting personhood, both procedurally and substantively.95 The causal link may thus be
established either directly, if we show that the purely instrumental pursuit of the principles of legality
tends to transform into a freedom-based protection of legality; or it can be established indirectly if it
can be shown that the instrumental adoption of the principles of legality may give a regime certain
stability that will (tend to) start the slow process of legitimation.
This is a very optimistic story, and undoubtedly it can be countered by a pessimistic one: Realizing
that people tend to associate respect for procedural legality with legitimacy,96 the evil ruler may come
to exploit respect for procedural morality for the pursuit of self-interested (or worse) ends. Strict
compliance with procedural morality may lure the law’s subjects to mistake it for respect for
substantive justice. This is different from the claim that the principles of legality are simply an efficient
way of getting one’s way, but it is no less, perhaps more, sinister in its implications.
It is difficult to be sure which story is more likely to be realized, especially since both stories can be
true in different times and places. Part of the difficulty in evaluating these stories has to do with the
difficulty of operationalizing the relevant variables and measuring them; but part of the difficulty, no
less significant, is that assessing this claim requires making evaluative judgments on the substantive
morality of different regimes. Those who think that Western democracies are, by and large, just (or at
least not grossly unjust), may well be sympathetic to the idea (or at least the possibility) of “civilizing”
effects of procedural constraints on substantive law. Those more critical of such states as unjust and
hypocritical may find the principles of legality nothing but a cynical ploy to trick individuals into a
false sense of complacency and unjustified trust in unjust regimes. Obviously, these are questions that
cannot be answered here. But if I am correct, I have shown a way of understanding Fuller’s empirical
claim as one worthy of serious examination.

V. Implications for Contemporary Debates
Why has all this been ignored? No doubt, Fuller deserves part of the blame. He did not draw clear
links between his work on freedom and his work in jurisprudence. But even if he has not done that,
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why haven’t others? In part, it may have to do with the fact that republican conception of freedom was
until fairly recently somewhat overshadowed by Berlin’s contrast between negative and positive
freedom, into which, as already noted, republican freedom fits rather poorly. Even after the “republican
revival” it may be that Fuller’s original blending of republican ideas with ideas coming from distinctly
un-republican sources may have obscured understanding of his thought.97 I think, however, that an
important, perhaps the main, reason for the neglect of Fuller’s ideas on freedom, has to do with the
contemporary tendency to separate jurisprudence from political theory. As a result, Fuller’s writings on
freedom could have been ignored exactly because their overt concern with political concepts seemed to
imply they could have no bearing on legal theory. These writings’ reference to freedom in their title was
all that a legal philosopher needed to conclude that they can be safely ignored. For this reason I wish to
address here, quite briefly, some of the broader questions of jurisprudence, in particular its point. I will
try to show that some things Fuller has said on the matter already in the 1960s remain significant fifty
years on.

(a) The American Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller
I opened this essay with the question whether it made sense to talk about American jurisprudence.
Based on what I have written above, I would like now to explain why it may be so, at least as far as
Fuller’s jurisprudence is concerned. One sense, psychological or biographical, is that Fuller (just like
Hart, Dworkin, Kelsen,98 or anyone else) wrote against the background of a legal system and a political
tradition he was familiar with, and so he may have come to see the familiar as natural or even
inevitable. Fuller may have relied on broadly republican ideas of freedom, because they had played a
more significant role in American political history than in that of other countries, and being immersed
in American political discourse he may have come to see them as the “correct” ones.
Presented as such, against the background that sees the aim of jurisprudence to provide a
universal account of the nature of law, this may seem like a failure on Fuller’s part, reflecting his
inability to extract himself sufficiently from the particular political history of his own country. I
suggest a different way of understanding Fuller’s argument. My claim is not that Fuller’s jurisprudence
is “American” because Fuller was American. After all, that these ideas have found prominence in the
American political thought and American political institutions, does not imply that one has to be an
American to write jurisprudence inspired by these political idea(l)s, even less so that only an American
could notice or grasp them. In this respect, these ideas are universal.
Fuller’s jurisprudence can nevertheless be seen as “American” in the sense that it sought a theory
of law grounded in ideas that proved prominent in American politics, and arguably have played a
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significant role in the shaping of American political and legal institutions.99 Fuller was impressed by
Michael Oakeshott’s treatment of the idea of a political tradition, and in particular with Oakeshott’s
claim that the study of politics and political institutions is the study of the “‘intimations’ of our
traditions.”100 Put simply, what matters is not that Fuller was influenced by republican ideas of
freedom, but that American lawyers were.

(b) Is Conceptual Jurisprudence Possible?
Those who dislike Fuller’s work for all its supposed confusions might welcome my reconstruction of
his ideas as proof that he committed the ultimate jurisprudential sin: he confused politically-neutral
conceptual jurisprudence with normative political theory.101 More charitably, they might admit that
Fuller may not have been the fool they had taken him to be, that he concerned himself with valid and
valuable questions, but ones that are decidedly different from theirs. The question they are concerned
with, and the only question that belongs to general jurisprudence properly and strictly so-called, is
precisely the part that remains of law after we have removed from it all local influences, including
political ones.
This, however, is not how Fuller saw things. Fuller did not think he was merely engaged in a
different enterprise, leaving the conceptual inquiry for those more interested in it. Fuller clearly
doubted the possibility of the conceptual enterprise. He made it clear in The Morality of Law that he
thought conceptual jurisprudence was “without intelligible content,” and which has led legal theorists
to a “blind alley.”102 Shortly afterwards he wrote: “standing like a huge question mark over the whole
analytical school is W.V. Quine’s unrefuted and still imperfectly absorbed challenge to the distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgments….”103 Two years later, he ended his “Reply to Critics” with
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the exasperated plea that “legal philosophers…cease to be preoccupied with building ‘conceptual
models’ to represent legal phenomena.”104
For Fuller, if the question “what is law?” is to be given a “philosophical” answer (as opposed to a
detailed empirical account), it necessarily involves the invocation of an ideal-type. In “actual life” law
and managerial direction (and presumably all other forms of social order) “present themselves…in
many mixed, ambiguous, and distorted forms.”105 The contribution a philosopher can make to
understanding a social practice was not by attempting to identify the features that are unique to the
practice as it is; rather, the philosopher can illuminate the practice by presenting a pure case which may
have never existed. It is exactly this fact that can explain why and how it can illuminate the practice. To
be sure, an ideal-type had better bear some resemblance to the real-world practice we call “law,” for
otherwise it would not be particularly useful for understanding (and improving) that practice; in this
respect Fuller’s account is obviously based on certain assumptions on what law is actually like. These
assumptions are observational and in this respect such an account may be challenged on “descriptive”
grounds. But beyond that, an ideal-type is not a description. It is a reconstruction, based on normative
standards. I believe this is a running theme in Fuller’s thinking from long before his exchanges with
Hart, and can be traced back to his repeated insistence on the impossibility of clearly separating “is”
and “ought,” which may be understood as a somewhat clumsy way of rejecting the distinction between
conceptual and normative jurisprudence.106
If this is true, it must be the case that even those who believed they were engaged in pure
conceptual jurisprudence were in fact doing something else, that just like him their conceptual analysis
depended on political ideas, only he was more aware what he was doing. In his writings on freedom
Hart was clearly sympathetic to a more “negative” conception of freedom, freedom as noninterference,107 and as his words comparing the English and the American understandings of freedom
indicate, he took the negative conception to represent the prevailing view of freedom in England. One
way of understanding Fuller’s challenge is that Hart’s “conceptual” claims about law owe more than he
realized to this conception of freedom.108 Hart saw law primarily as a means to guide conduct,109 and
he saw it primarily a set of rules imposed from above. As he put it, unlike the pre-legal society, in the
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legal system “the acceptance of the rules as common standards for the group may be split off from the
relatively passive matter of the ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by obeying them for his part
alone.”110 From this perspective, it is not surprising that the principles of legality are perceived as
merely technical guarantees for the efficient delivery of edicts from ruler to subject. But this conclusion
depends on an implicit acceptance of the Hartian picture of law, which in turn is based on a particular
view of freedom.
This point is of much greater significance for debates about the nature of law than my comparison
of the works of Hart and Fuller.111 After all, the committed conceptualist could accept that Hart’s
theory was less conceptually “pure” than he thought it to be and then call on legal philosophers to
double down on their efforts to purge jurisprudence of infiltrations from political philosophy. This
response raises many questions that go beyond the scope of this essay and which I cannot address here.
For the record I will assert without much argument that the view that any attempt to answer the
question of the nature of law in a particular jurisdiction must presuppose an answer to the question to
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the more abstract question of the nature of law in general (“If there is no general jurisprudence…then
there is also no special jurisprudence”112) is false. This view presupposes that all things we call “law”
belong to the same kind, but that is an unwarranted and question-begging assumption. Even if I am
wrong about that, it is worth pointing out that those who propose this view must openly acknowledge
that there may be nothing (or at least nothing illuminating) left after we have stripped a philosophical
account of what law is of its political elements.
There is one challenge I will address here because it concerns my argument. The challenge is that
my argument would seem to imply that the English don’t have law, or that what they call law is a
different form of social order from American law. Fuller did not explicitly endorse anything like this
view, indeed his attempt to explain what law is, even if based on political premises, suggests he would
have rejected this view. There are several possible responses to this view. One is that Fuller would have
argued that even English law is committed to the protection of the procedural principles of legality and
that is sufficient to show that English law belongs to the same form of social order. Another might be
to argue that notions of reciprocity are also present in English law, perhaps by developing the familiar
idea that the common law as a form of customary law. Yet another might be to argue that to the extent
that English law is no longer reciprocal in the manner he discussed, its legitimacy is threatened.113
Finally, Fuller may bite the bullet and concede that American and English law do indeed reflect
different forms of social order, each with its mode of legitimation.

VI. Conclusion
Since so much of what is currently debated in contemporary English-language jurisprudence can be
traced back to the exchange that Hart’s Concept of Law and Fuller’s Morality of Law were part of, it is
difficult to avoid comparisons between the two books. Elsewhere I have expressed the view
(undoubtedly crazy, in the eyes of many) that for all its flaws, Fuller’s book is the more insightful of the
two.114 It is also the more frustrating one. Over the years numerous people have mentioned some
(valid) reasons for this frustration. This essay shows that the insight and frustration derive from the
same source. As I tried to show Fuller’s writings are full of interesting ideas, often drawing links
between seemingly unrelated issues. Unfortunately, the same features tend to throw Fuller off in
different directions in a fashion that can seem confused and confusing. A more careful dissection of
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Fuller’s ideas of freedom than I could do here might have attempted to disentangle interaction from
participation and reciprocity from self-government in a more discrimination fashion. It might have
inquired more carefully into the relationship of all these ideas to freedom (as nondomination). That is
not where Fuller’s strengths lay. But what his work shows is that there is more to the understanding of
human affairs than analytic rigor.
This essay has added yet another reason for finding The Morality of Law frustrating. It is
frustrating, because if I am right, one cannot make sense of what’s in the book without taking into
account of ideas developed elsewhere and which are only alluded to in it. As those ideas have largely
been ignored, it is perhaps no surprise that the book has often been misunderstood. Properly
understood the book should be read not just as a critique of legal positivism, but more fundamentally
as a critique of the divide between conceptual and normative jurisprudence that twentieth-century
legal positivism presupposes. On the positive side, The Morality of Law together with Fuller’s ideas on
freedom can be understood as providing the foundations for understanding law in the modern state. It
is well-known that one of the marks of modern state is the massive expansion of the scope and reach of
law to all aspects of human life. Understandably, this has been a cause for much concern about the way
modern law is nothing but a mask for an all-consuming tyranny. The most neglected message of The
Morality of Law may be Fuller’s attempt to explain how, despite this enormous expansion, law may
remain legitimate.
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